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Short Abstract 
 
Two experiments show that a shortage of self-regulatory resources results in more risk 
aversion in mixed-gamble (gain/loss) situations. The findings support a dual-process 
view that distinguishes between a rational and an affective information processing 
system, in which self-regulatory resources are the necessary fuel for the rational system. 
Depending on the expected values of risk seeking versus risk averse behavior, ego 
depletion can have negative (experiment 1) as well as positive (experiment 2) 
consequences for investment behavior.  
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Extended Abstract 
Previous research has shown that self-regulatory strength is crucial to exert willpower. It 
has been found that a depletion of self-regulatory resources very often leads to 
detrimental behavior such as overeating and impulsive buying (Vohs and Faber 2007; 
Vohs and Heatherton 2000). However, not much is known about how the availability of 
these resources is related to risky decision making. The current research shows that a 
state of ego-depletion leads to higher levels of risk aversion in mixed gambles (involving 
mixtures of gains and losses). 
Risk aversion for mixed gambles refers to the tendency of people to reject a gamble with 
an equal chance to win or to lose, even when the expected value of gambling is higher 
than the expected value of not gambling (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Recent 
developments in the field of neuroscience and psychology indicate that anticipatory 
emotional reactions that are elicited by features of the risky decision alternatives are 
crucial in understanding risk taking and risk seeking (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; 
Loewenstein et al. 2001).  
In the current research, we adopt a dual-process framework that distinguishes between a 
rational (cognitive) and an experiential (emotional) information processing system 
(Epstein and Pacini 1999), in order to explain greater risk avoidance in a state of ego-
depletion. In a situation where one has to make a choice between a risky and a less risky 
alternative, both the rational and the experiential system generate an “advice” concerning 
the most desirable behavior. The outcome of the rational system is determined by a 
cognitive assessment of probabilities of decision outcomes and outcome severity, 
whereas the outcome of the experiential system is determined by an automatic retrieval of 
accumulated knowledge from previous experiences. Since the experiential system 
attaches greater weight to previously experienced negative contingencies than to 
previously experienced positive contingencies of the choice options (De Houwer, 
Thomas, and Baeyens 2001), it guides the decision maker away from risky alternatives. 
Given that the rational system is the slower, analytical system it is in an ideal position to 
monitor and inhibit the output of the faster, associative experiential system. However, 
building on previous research that puts forward self-regulatory resources as the necessary 
fuel for the rational system (Vohs 2006), we hypothesize that a depletion of self-
regulatory resources impairs the inhibiting capacity of the rational system. As a 
consequence, the output of the experiential system is weighted more heavily in the final 
decision, resulting in more risk aversive behavior among ego-depleted individuals. 
Two experiments provide support for this reasoning. In both experiments, the availability 
of self-regulatory resources was manipulated by a modified version of the Stroop task 
(Stroop 1935). Inhibiting first responses (which is the general purpose of this task) has 
been shown to consume self-regulatory resources (e.g., Inzlicht and Gutsell 2007; 
Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister 1998; Wallace and Baumeister 2002), and is therefore an 
effective way of inducing a state of ego-depletion. 
In Study 1, the Stroop task was followed by an investment task which has previously 
been used to compare decision making of patients with lesions to the brain’s emotional 
circuitry and patients with substance dependence to decisions made by a normal control 
group (Shiv et al. 2005a; Shiv et al. 2005b). The task consists of 20 decision rounds in 
which one can choose between investing $1 or not investing $1. An investment decision 
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is followed by a coin toss; heads results in losing the $1, tails results in gaining $2.50. If a 
participant decides not to invest, the game advances to the next round. Since the expected 
value of risk seeking behavior (invest) is higher than the expected value of risk aversive 
behavior (not invest), a rational decision maker should always decide to invest. 
Participant’s predisposition to rely on experiential processing was measured with the 
experientiality subscale of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini and Epstein 1999). 
As the experiential system is an associative information processing system that generates 
emotional responses based on previous outcomes, we only expected it to influence 
investment decisions of depleted participants after some experience with the task at hand 
(i.e. in the second block of 10 trials). Additionally, we expected a moderation of the 
effect by experientiality. Indeed, if the weighting of the outcomes of the experiential 
system is dispositionally low, the rational monitoring system should still be able to 
override the responses generated by the experiential processing system.  
As predicted, the three-way interaction between state of self-regulation (control; 
depleted), experientiality (high; low) and decision block (first block of 10 decisions; 
second block of 10 decisions) was significant. After having gained some experience with 
the investment task, ego-depleted participants with a tendency to rely on their 
experiential “hunches” clearly showed higher levels of risk aversion. 
The goal of the second study was to demonstrate that a lower availability of self-
regulatory resources can be beneficial for decision making in a situation where the 
expected value of risk avoidant behavior is higher than the expected value of risk seeking 
behavior. After completing the modified Stroop task, participants continued with the 
Iowa Gambling Task (see Bechara et al. 1994, for exact procedures and pay-off 
structure). Participants had to choose 100 times between cards from four different decks. 
Two decks are low-risky decks with a high expected value, and two decks are high-risky 
decks with a lower expected value. Results showed that ego-depleted participants 
selected significantly more cards from the low-risky decks with a higher expected value.  
In sum, in two experiments we showed that a lower availability of self-regulatory 
resources increases risk aversion in mixed gambles (study 1 & study 2). This finding can 
be explained by an increased weighting of experiential processing in decision making 
(study 1) and implies that ego-depletion is not always detrimental for decision making, 
but can also guide people towards more beneficial choice options (study 2).  
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THE EMOTIONAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEM IS RISK AVERSE:  
EGO-DEPLETION AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 
 
 An extensive body of research has shown that self-regulatory resources can easily 
be depleted by short actions of self-control resulting in a state of ego-depletion 
(Baumeister 2002; Baumeister et al. 1998; Muraven et al. 1998). Prior research has 
focused primarily on the consequences of ego-depletion on the ability to exert willpower. 
The general finding is that breakdowns in self-regulatory efforts due to prior exertion of 
willpower and the coinciding consumption of precious self-regulatory resources make 
people place less weight on their long-term goals and plans. As a consequence, people 
behave more impulsively in order to alleviate immediate urges and desires, which can 
result in detrimental behaviors like impulsive spending (Vohs and Faber 2007), 
overeating (Vohs and Heatherton 2000) or increased alcohol consumption (Muraven, 
Collins, and Nienhaus 2002). 
 Not much is known, however, about the consequences of a state of ego-depletion 
for decisions made under uncertainty. In this article, we investigate how the availability 
of self-regulation strength is related to risk seeking and risk aversion in “mixed” gambles 
(involving mixtures of gains and losses). We adopt a dual-process framework that models 
behavior as a joint function of the outcomes of a rational and an emotional information 
processing system and build on previous research that puts forward self-regulatory 
resources as the necessary fuel for the rational system to work (Vohs 2006). Risk 
attitudes of ego-depleted participants and control participants are compared in two risky 
decision-making tasks that simulate real-life investment decisions. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In the past 25 years, the judgment and decision making literature has invested a 
lot of effort in uncovering irrationalities of human decision making. One typical finding 
is that most people irrationally reject a gamble with equal chances to win and lose, even 
when the expected value of gambling is larger than the expected value of the status quo, a 
phenomenon called risk aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). These irrationalities of 
human choice have cast serious doubt on the long-standing rational, normative view on 
economic decision making in which consumers are described as economic actors that 
select alternative options with the highest expected utility or value (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944). 
Prospect Theory explains the tendency to be risk averse for “mixed” (gain/loss) 
gambles using the concept of loss aversion, which is popularly phrased as the fact that 
losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Loss aversion refers to the 
fact that the aggravation one experiences when losing a sum of money is greater than the 
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount of money. Therefore decision makers 
confronted with a gamble offering a 50/50 chance to either gain or lose $50 are expected 
to be risk averse and reject the gamble (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).  
However, Prospect Theory does not explain why human beings are loss averse. 
Recent theoretical developments in the field of neuroscience and psychology highlight 
the role of anticipatory emotional reactions that are elicited by features of risky decision 
alternatives (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Loewenstein et al. 2001). It is argued that 
these affective responses are more rapid and basic than cognitive evaluations and are 
often used as proxies for value. By providing a rapid and crude assessment of the 
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behavioral options an organism is faced with, these affective responses exert a direct 
influence on behavior: things that feel good must be approached, and things that feel bad 
must be avoided. Whereas the rational perspective holds that preferences for certain 
decision alternatives result from logical inference or cost-benefit analysis, the emotional 
perspective proposes that likes and dislikes are acquired from previous experience 
through associative learning or conditioning (De Houwer et al. 2001).  
These conditioned emotional responses are said to be crucial in explaining loss 
aversion and the resulting risk aversive tendency in mixed-gambles situations. Evidence 
for this argument stems mainly from neuropsychological research comparing patients 
with lesions to the brain’s emotional circuitry, including amygdala and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, with normals in experimental risky decision-making tasks (Bechara et 
al. 1999; Bechara et al. 1997; Shiv, Loewenstein, and Bechara 2005a; Shiv et al. 2005b). 
This research typically finds that lesion patients tend to be more risk seeking relative to a 
normal control group, providing support for the claim that brain structures involved in 
emotional information processing are crucial in understanding risky decision making.  
Attempts to incorporate the rational and affective perspective in one theoretical 
framework typically propose that human beings have two information processing 
systems. For example, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) proposes that people’s 
behavior is determined by the outcomes of two different information-processing systems, 
a preconscious “experiential system” and a conscious “rational system” (Epstein 1994). 
Whereas the rational system is an affect-free, slow and analytical inferential system, the 
experiential system is a rapid, associative learning system that is intimately related with 
affect.  
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The experiential and the rational system do not have identical determinants nor do 
they have equal consequences for risky behavior. When a person has to make a decision 
between a certain and a risky option, the experiential system automatically retrieves 
accumulated knowledge from previous experiences with the decision alternatives under 
consideration. The affective reactions triggered by this associative retrieval process guide 
behavior towards desirable outcomes and away from undesirable ones. The rational 
system, on the other hand, depends more on objective probabilities of outcomes and 
assessments of outcome severity. Thus, whereas the reactions of the experiential system 
depend on personal exposure to the outcomes under consideration and the past history of 
conditioning, the outcomes of the rational system are determined by objective features of 
the risky situation.  
As a consequence, the responses of the experiential system to an identical 
situation are expected to change over time depending on previous experience with that 
situation, whereas the reaction of the rational system should be stable under unchanged 
objective features of the decision situation. Since there is a general bias in animals and 
humans to give greater weight to negative contingencies (losses) than to positive 
contingencies (gains) (De Houwer et al. 2001; Rozin and Royzman 2001; Tom et al. 
2007), the experiential learning system is likely to become more loss aversive over time 
resulting in more risk aversion for mixed gambles. 
Given that the rational system is the slower information processing system, it is in 
an ideal position to monitor the output of the experiential system and correct it if 
necessary (Epstein 2003; Kahneman and Frederick 2002). Recently, self-regulatory 
resources have been put forward as the crucial fuel for the cognitive system (Vohs 2006). 
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When sufficient resources are available, the output of the experiential system is being 
closely monitored by the rational system and can be overridden if necessary; however, 
when resources are scarce the monitoring capacity of the rational system is reduced and 
the experiential system’s output should be weighted more heavily in the final decision 
(Strack, Werth, and Deutsch 2006).  
It is well-established that self-regulatory resources can easily be depleted by short 
actions of self-control resulting in a state of ego-depletion (Baumeister 2002; Baumeister 
et al. 1998; Muraven et al. 1998). In this research we compare risk attitudes of ego-
depleted participants and control participants in two risky decision-making tasks that 
simulate real-life investment decisions in the way they factor uncertainty, rewards, and 
punishments. These tasks have previously been used to compare brain-damaged patients 
with normal individuals in terms of risky behavior, and typically find that patients with 
lesions to the neural system subserving emotion show more risk seeking behavior. 
Because these abnormalities may represent extreme ends of a normal continuum of 
information processing, results with clinical patients can illuminate issues in the normal 
population. Indeed, if the absence of affective responses due to dysfunctions in the 
emotional brain circuitry results in reduced levels of risk aversion, it is likely that for 
normal participants a higher emotional reactivity due to a depletion of self-regulatory 
resources may result in increasing levels of risk aversion. Such a finding would provide 
support for the idea that self-regulatory resources indeed power the rational system and 
that a depletion of these resources unleashes the experiential, affective processing system 
establishing itself in more risk aversion. 
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STUDY 1 
The purpose of the first study was to (1) provide empirical evidence that a 
temporary reduction in self-regulatory resources increases risk aversion for mixed 
gambles and (2) explore what underlies this risk aversion by examining whether the 
effect is moderated by experience with the gambling situation and by a person’s tendency 
to rely on the output of the experiential system. 
In this study, we adopted a risky decision making task that has previously been 
used to compare patients with brain damage to the emotional circuitry and individuals 
with substance dependence with a normal control group in terms of risk taking and risk 
aversion (Shiv et al. 2005a; Shiv et al. 2005b). The task consists of 20 rounds of 
investment decisions in which participants have to make a choice between two options: 
invest $1 or don’t invest $1. A risk seeking decision to invest is followed by a coin toss, 
with an outcome of heads resulting in a loss of $1 and an outcome of tails resulting in a 
gain of $2.50. If a participant is risk averse and decides not to invest, the task advances to 
the next round. Notice that on each round the decision maker is fully aware of the 
contingencies associated with gambling or not gambling and that these contingencies are 
held constant over time. This makes the task especially suited to test our main 
predictions.  
Moderation by experience with the task 
In the initial stages of the task we do not expect to find a difference between ego-
depleted participants and control participants in terms of risk preferences. Indeed, since 
the responses of the experiential system are shaped through prior experience according to 
the principles of associative learning and since the task is completely new, the 
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experiential information processing system does not yet generate an affective response 
towards the behavioral options; hence in both ego-depleted and control participants the 
affective output of the experiential processing system is expected to be minimal. The 
investment decision can only be determined by a computation of the expected value for 
each decision alternative. As the expected value of a risk seeking choice ($1.25) is higher 
than the expected value of a risk avoidant choice ($1), the behavioral response should be 
to invest. However, as the task progresses and participants gain experience with the 
outcomes of the decision options, the experiential system starts generating affective 
responses towards the choice options. Given the higher emotional reactivity to losses than 
to gains (De Houwer et al. 2001; Tom et al. 2007), the experiential system guides 
behavior away from the risky decision alternative and towards the more certain option. 
This risk avoidant experiential “advice” will be weighted more heavily in the final 
decision of participants who are low in self-regulatory strength because of the reduced 
capacity of their rational system to inhibit affective responses. 
 Moderation by experientiality 
Among depleted participants, the impact of anticipatory emotional reactions on 
the final decision will be weaker for individuals with a predispositional tendency to 
suppress experiential processing. Indeed, we expect that these individuals are able to 
inhibit weak experiential reactions even when their self-regulatory resources are reduced. 
However, ego-depleted participants attaching greater value to the experiential processing 
system should show a significant reduced propensity for risky behavior relative to control 
participants after having gained some experience with the task. 
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Note that the task provides a conservative test for our hypothesis in two ways. 
First, since monetary payoffs promote a rational processing mode by virtue of its 
fungibility the task may reduce loss aversion effects (Rozin et al. 2007). Second, 
participants are explicitly told about the payoff structure of the task. A computation of the 
expected value for each choice alternative is straightforward and likely to reduce the 
impact of anticipatory emotional signals (Bechara 2004).   
Method 
 Design and participants. The design of this study was a two-factor design with 
ego-depletion manipulated between subjects and level of experiential processing 
measured as a continuous variable. Sixty-four undergraduate students participated for 
course credit (27 females and 37 males, for age, M = 20.95, SD = 2.01) 
Procedure. Students were run individually in experimental cubicles and were 
informed that they would participate in a study consisting of two unrelated games, a color 
game and an investment game. The color game was in fact a modified Stroop Task, 
designed to manipulate ego-depletion.  
Before starting the Stroop task, participants were asked to complete a short 
questionnaire, intended to measure experientiality. The items for this measure were 
sampled from the experientiality subscale of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini 
and Epstein 1999). This scale measures to what extent an individual is inclined to weigh 
the outcomes of the experiential system in decision making. Because of time limitations, 
we selected 8 items from the 24 original items. Four items were positively scored (e.g., “I 
like to rely on my intuitive impressions”, “I tend to use my heart as a guide for my 
actions”), while the four other items were reverse-scored (e.g., “I don’t have a very good 
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sense of intuition”, “I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important 
decisions”). Items were rated on a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 (definitely not true of 
myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself).  
In order to induce a state of ego-depletion, we used a modified version of the 
Stroop task (Stroop 1935). Participants were instructed to indicate the ink color in which 
color names were written in 75 consecutive trials. Words and ink colors were either 
matched (e.g., RED in red ink; control condition) or mismatched (e.g., RED in yellow 
ink, depleting condition). In addition, in the depleting condition, participants were 
instructed to indicate the word rather than the ink color whenever a word in blue ink 
appeared, which was the case in 25% of the trials. Notice that the Stroop task perfectly 
illustrates the supervisory role of the rational system outlined above. Participants in the 
mismatch condition tend to stumble because the word is automatically read and activates 
a response that is in competition with the required response. Successful monitoring and 
correction by the rational system is needed in order to avoid errors. This monitoring 
process in Stroop task consumes self-regulatory strength (e.g., Inzlicht and Gutsell 2007; 
Muraven et al. 1998; Wallace and Baumeister 2002). Five participants who clearly did 
not understand the instructions of the Stroop task were not considered in further data 
analysis. These participants erred on more than 25% of the trials and together they 
accounted for more than 70% of the total amount of errors that were made in the Stroop 
task.  
When a participant had successfully completed the Stroop task, s/he was invited 
to participate in an investment game (Shiv et al. 2005a; Shiv et al. 2005b). At the start of 
the game, every participant was endowed with $20 of play money. Participants were 
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informed that they would be making several rounds of investment decisions. In every 
round, they would have to make a decision between investing $1 and keeping $1. If a 
participant decided to invest, a coin would be tossed. If the outcome of the toss was 
heads, the participant would lose the $1 that he or she invested. However, if the outcome 
was tails, $2.50 was added to the participant’s account. If a participant decided not to 
invest, the game would advance to the next round. The game was stopped when a 
participant had gone through 20 rounds of investment decisions.  
Results 
In order to analyze how investment behavior evolved over time, the 20 rounds of 
investment decisions were broken down in 2 blocks of 10 decisions. For experientiality, 
we averaged the scores on the 8 items (α = .77) and assigned individuals to the low and 
high experientiality conditions based on a median split. The data were analyzed with a 2 
(state of self-regulation: control, depleted) x 2 (block: first, second) x 2(experientiality: 
high, low) mixed ANOVA, with state of self-regulation and experientiality as between-
subjects factors and block as a within-subject factor. Because a number of studies have 
found that male individuals tend to be more risk averse than female individuals (see 
Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer 1999, for a meta-analysis), gender was added to the model as 
a control variable. 
This analysis yielded the predicted three-way interaction between experientiality, 
initial task and block (F(1, 54) = 3.97, p = .05). Gender did not have a significant effect 
on the total amount of investments (F(1, 54) = 1.15, p = .29), nor did it interact with 
block (F(1, 54) = 1.01, p = .32), and was therefore dropped from the model for further 
analysis 
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We hypothesized that the experiential system should be responsible for a decrease 
in investment decisions among depleted participants. Because the experiential system is a 
learning system generating emotional responses that are acquired through previous 
experience, we only expected an increased level of risk aversion after having gained 
some experience with the task. In line with this reasoning, we found a significant 
interaction between experientiality and state of self-regulation in the second block (F(1, 
55) = 3.77, p = .05), whereas this interaction was not significant in the first block (F(1, 
55) = 0.05, p = .82). After having gained some experience with the task, highly 
experiential individuals who were depleted of self-regulatory resources were significantly 
more risk averse – and thus made fewer investment decisions – than highly experiential 
control participants (4.92 vs. 7.33), (F(1, 55) = 4.45, p < .05). No effect of self-regulatory 
depletion was apparent for low experiential respondents (F(1, 55) = 0.35, p = .56). The 
absence of an effect of depletion on risk preferences in block 1 and the moderation of the 
depletion effect by experientiality in block 2 provides strong support for the crucial role 
played by the experiential system in the development of risk aversion in mixed gambles. 
Table 1 provides an overview of all the cell means and standard deviations. 
 
Table 1. Overview of means and standard deviations per block of 10 investment decisions  
   Block 1 Block 2 
  N Mean SD Mean SD 
Low Experiential 20 7.80  2.09 7.20  2.46 Control 
High Experiential 15 7.73  1.71 7.33  3.33 
Low Experiential 12 8.92  1.16 7.83  2.94 Depletion 
High Experiential 12 8.00  2.41 4.92  3.20 
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Discussion  
The results of study 1 show that depletion of the self-regulatory resources that 
power the rational monitoring system causes more risk aversive behavior (i.e., fewer 
investment decisions) in mixed-gambles situations. The fact that this effect does not show 
immediately but only emerges after gaining some experience with the possible outcomes 
of different decision alternatives is in line with the reasoning that conditioned 
anticipatory emotional reactions are underlying risk aversion. This claim is further 
supported by a moderation of the effect by experientiality. 
The findings support a rational-experiential dual-process model in which the 
rational system monitors and corrects the outcomes of the experiential system. When 
self-regulatory resources are available, or the value attached to experiential input is low, 
decisions are made under rational control and based on a cognitive assessment of 
expected value. However, after depleting self-regulatory resources the experiential 
system is “free” from the controlling rational system. Participants who have a 
dispositionally strong reliance on the experiential system will then be disproportionally 
influenced by the experiential system’s aversion to negative outcomes and make fewer 
investment decisions in situations where it would clearly be optimal to invest 
STUDY 2 
The goal of study 2 was twofold. First, we wanted to generalize the findings of 
study 1 to a decision situation in which the reward/punishment contingencies of different 
choice options is opaque. This external validity check is important since in most real-life 
situations one is not perfectly aware of all possible decision outcomes and their 
respective probabilities of occurrence. Second, we wanted to demonstrate that people 
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with low self-regulatory resources can make more advantageous decisions than people 
with high self-regulatory resources. Indeed, whether a risk aversive decision strategy due 
to higher emotional reactivity is advantageous or disadvantageous is dependent on the 
objective expected value that is paired with risk aversive and a risk seeking decisions 
(Loewenstein et al. 2001). When risk aversive choices have a higher expected value 
relative to risk seeking choices, an individual should benefit from having a reduction in 
self-regulatory strength.  
In order to accomplish these research objectives, we compared decisions made by 
depleted participants with decisions made by control participants in the Iowa Gambling 
Task (Bechara et al. 1997). This task requires a person to repeatedly choose a card from 
four decks of cards. Each card brings a certain gain and some cards also bring losses. The 
objective of the game is to gain a maximum amount of money. Two of the four decks are 
highly risky and have a negative expected value because they bring high rewards but 
even higher penalties. The other two decks are less risky, featuring smaller payoffs, but 
even smaller penalties, hence a positive expected value. Importantly, the 
reward/punishment schedule is unknown to participants. This makes a cognitive 
assessment of the expected value of the four choice options impossible.  
Previous research using this experimental paradigm has indicated that individuals 
with an intact emotional processing system tend to perform better relative to individuals 
with emotional dysfunctions because normal individuals take less risks that result in 
catastrophic losses (Bechara et al. 1994). A correlation between the development of 
anticipatory skin conductance responses generated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
and performance in the decision making task (Bechara et al. 1997), signals the 
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importance of anticipatory emotional reactions and the “emotional” brain for successful 
performance in this task. Analogous to these clinical findings, we expect that boosting the 
impact of the more emotional experiential system by depleting healthy participants’ self-
regulatory resources prior to engaging in the Iowa Gambling Task should lead to more 
risk avoidance, hence enhanced performance in this task. Contrary to the gambling task 
in experiment 1, this time a rational computation of the expected value of available 
choice options is impossible from trial 1. Instead, participants have to learn the payoff 
structure in the Iowa Gambling Task from experience. Depleted participants’ greater 
sensitivity to risk should lead them to pick from the safer decks almost from the very 
beginning.  
Method 
 Design and participants. Fifty-seven undergraduate students (32 men and 25 
women, for age, M = 21.28, SD = 2.06) at a large university participated in this study in 
exchange for course credits or a monetary payment of $3. Participants were run in 
individual sessions of approximately 20 minutes. They were told that they would 
participate in a study that consisted of two unrelated games: a color game and a gambling 
game. 
Procedure. As in study 1, ego-depletion was manipulated between subjects by 
means of a control and a depleting version of the Stroop task. After completing the 
Stroop task, participants were invited to engage in a computerized version of the Iowa 
Gambling Task (see Bechara et al. 1994, for the exact payoff structure of this task). 
Participants were endowed with $2000 of play money. The game required from a 
participant to make a long series of card selections from four decks of cards until they 
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were told to stop (after turning 100 cards). With every card a participant turned, he or she 
won a certain amount of money, depending on which deck was selected. Participants 
were instructed to try to maximize profits. Turning any card from deck A or B was 
rewarded with $100 and turning a card from deck C or D yielded $50. After turning some 
cards, the participants both won and lost an amount of money. Like the gains, these losses 
also varied with the deck, but unlike the gains, they also changed with the position in the 
deck, according to a schedule unknown to the participants. The punishments that a 
participant encountered in deck A and B were higher than the punishments in deck C and 
D. Turning a card from deck A or B was more risky than turning a card from deck C or D 
since the first were associated with higher punishments and with higher rewards, while 
the latter yielded lower punishments and lower rewards. The deck contingencies were 
fixed in such a way that turning 10 cards from deck A or B incurred a net loss of $250. 
Indeed, turning 10 cards from deck A or B resulted in a total punishment of $1250, while 
turning 10 cards from deck C or D only resulted in a total loss of $250. Hence, turning 10 
cards from deck C or D, on the other hand, resulted in a net gain of $250. While each 
card of deck A and B yielded a higher monetary reward than each card of deck C and D, 
in terms of expected value it was still better to draw cards from decks C and D since the 
penalties that were tied to deck A and B were also higher. In short, decks A and B can be 
regarded as high-risk decks whereas decks C and D can be considered as low-risk decks. 
By choosing exclusively from the low-risk decks, a participant could maximize profit. 
Results 
We expect the effect of depletion on investment decisions to be limited in time for 
two reasons. First, previous research has shown that repeatedly making deliberate choices 
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is depleting by itself (Bruyneel et al. 2006). Thus, even control participants can be 
expected to become depleted during a task in which 100 decisions have to be made. 
Second, after a sufficient number of samples the payoff structure of the different decks 
will become clear and with it the rationality of picking from decks C and D only. 
Therefore, we only expected to find a difference in the initial stages of the game and 
considered the first 40 choices that were made by each participant for analysis. As in 
conventional analyses of Iowa Gambling Task performance (Bechara et al. 1994),we 
computed a net score by subtracting the number of risky from non-risky card selections 
[(C+D)-(A+B)]. A higher net score implies a more risk averse and advantageous decision 
strategy.  
A one-way ANOVA (Initial task: control, depleting) was conducted with the net 
score obtained in the Iowa Gambling Task as the dependent measure. Gender was again 
included in the model as a control variable. This analysis yields a main effect for state of 
self-regulation (F(1, 54) = 3.82, p = .05). Individuals who had to exert self-control in the 
first part of the study performed better (M = 1.14) than those who did not exert self-
control in the initial task (M = -6.34). The effect of gender was not significant (F(1, 54) = 
0.93, p = .34). 
As expected we could not find a significant difference between depleted and 
control participants after having made 40 choices, although depleted participants still 
showed directionally more risk avoidant behavior at this later stage of the game than 
control participants (10.43 vs. 7.38), (F(1, 54) = 0.27, NS).  
Discussion 
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The results of study 2 demonstrate that ego-depletion is advantageous for decision 
making when the expected value of risk aversive choices is higher than the expected 
value of risk seeking choices. Unlike in study 1, there was no perfect knowledge about 
the reward structure of the task. Therefore, a rational computation of the expected value 
for each decision alternative was not possible. Even in this case, where experiential 
information processing is an evident alternative for depleted as well as control 
participants, depleted participants showed markedly higher levels of risk aversion.    
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Our findings provide support for a dual process account of human decision 
making. This theory argues that human decisions are driven by two systems, one rational, 
symbolic, slow and resource-dependent and the other one experiential, intuitive, 
emotional, more automatic and associative. When ample resources are available, the 
rational system monitors the output of the experiential system. When self-regulatory 
resources are scarce, the intuitive system’s output will have a larger weight in the 
decision making process. Building on evidence that the experiential contingency learning 
system is highly sensitive to negative outcomes (De Houwer, Baeyens, and Field 2005; 
Tom et al. 2007), we hypothesize and find that in a state of ego depletion, when self-
regulatory resources are scarce, people become more risk averse. 
The involvement of the experiential system was most clearly demonstrated in the 
first experiment. In a task where investing is clearly the rational thing to do because it has 
a higher expected value than not investing, we find that investment decisions can be 
thwarted by the experiential system, provided that the resources for the analytical system 
are low and a person’s dispositional tendency to rely on the experiential system is high. 
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However, the experiential system’s sensitivity to negative outcomes most likely has a 
sound evolutionary basis. When self-regulatory resources are low, it makes good sense 
for an organism to behave prudently. In many situations, being risk averse pays off more 
than being risk seeking, and in such situations people in a state of ego depletion might 
actually outperform their non-depleted peers. Indeed, this is what we showed in our 
second experiment, involving the Iowa Gambling Task. The Iowa Gambling Task is an 
investment situation in which people choose repeatedly between high risk (high gains 
with high losses) and low risk (low gains with low losses) options, and only after 
substantial experience with the task does it become clear to decision makers that the low 
risk options have a positive expected value and the high risk options have a negative 
expected value. The risk aversion of people in a state of ego depletion helps them pick 
more often from the good decks right away 
Our results possibly bear a positive implication for gambling behavior. Generally 
considered a form of impulsive behavior (Baumeister and Heatherton 1996), gambling 
behavior can be expected to increase in a state of ego depletion (Strack et al. 2006), with 
potentially dire consequences. Indeed, the many choices and decisions involved in typical 
gambling situations can be expected to lead to an increased state of ego depletion 
(Bruyneel et al. 2006) which – if impulsive behavior would simply be unleashed – would 
result in a negative spiral of gambling investments. The increased risk aversion generated 
by ego depletion, especially among individuals with a greater tendency to rely on 
experiential processing, might be a powerful antidote to this otherwise self-destructive 
pattern. 
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